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I. INTRODUCTION 
ABSTRACT 
The ''theory of search'' -- the application of optimal stop-
This paper combines the ''theory of search'' -- the applica­
tion of optimal stopping rules to decision-making under uncertainty -­
with concepts from the theory of games in order to analyze new product 
development. A development. trial is envisioned as a random drawing of 
a production cost level, and a strategy is a rule describing condi­
tions under which no further development is desired � a stopping 
rule. Nash equilibrium in stopping rules is shown to exist and pos­
sess the reservation property, The possibility of multiple equilibria 
implies .that the usual comparative statics results need not hold in 
equilibrium -- e.g., an increase in firm i's development costs may 
result in an increase in the firm's development activity. 
ping rules to decision-making under uncertainty -- is well-developed 
for the case of an individual agent [Kohn and Shavell, 1974; Lippman 
and McCall, 1976; Rothschild, 1973] . It has been applied primarily to 
the problems of j ob search and consumers searching for the lowest 
price. However, a number of extensions, generalizations and new ap­
plications have been offered recently. Among these are the dynamic 
analysis of the inspection and evaluation of multiple-characteristic 
goods [Wilde, 1980] ; the characterization of optimal search when sam­
pling from a number of different distributions [Spulber, 1979; Weitz­
man, 1979]; and the application of standard search theory to the 
determination of market structure via uncertain imitability [Lippman 
and Rumelt, 1980], research and development [Evenson and Kislev, 1976; 
Spulber, forthcoming; Lee, 1980] , and the decision to adopt a new 
technology of uncertain value [Jensen, 1979]. 
In job search and consumer search applications, it is 
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reasonable to treat the decision-maker's problem as independent of the 
behavior of other searchers. But in the industrial organization prob-
lems mentioned above, one is interested in the effects of the behavior 
of rival firms upon a firm's decision-making process. This paper com-
bines search theory with concepts from the theory of games in order to 
analyze new product development. 
In Section II, the one-firm case is reviewed and related to 
other current research, In Section III the existence of Nash equili-
brium in stopping rules is demonstrated, The equilibrium stopping 
rules are shown to possess the reservation property, Section IV 
discusses comparative statics results, and Section V examines the ef-
feots of rivalry, Section VI concludes and suggests extensions, 
II. THE ONE-FIRM CASE
The idea of treating development activity as sampling from a 
distribution of economic returns is due to Evenson and Kislev [1976) , 
Spulber [forthcoming] and Lee [1980) separate research and development 
into two distinct but interrelated activities, Development is treated 
as a problem in sequential search, parametrized by the level of a 
technological index generated by prior research activity. A similar 
idea is found in Lippman and Rumelt's [1980) concept of uncertain imi-
tability. A firm considering entry into an industry must draw its 
production cost level from a distribution of possible costs; it cannot 
perfectly imitate the technology of other firms. Neither of these 
perfectly imitate the technology of other firms, Neither of these 
treatments is strategic -- i.e. , game theoretic.
1 
Thus the modeling
of development as a problem in sequential search is not new -- it is 
the addition of the strategic element which distinguishes this 
analysis from those discussed above. 
Assume that basic research, which is common knowledge, has 
made it apparent that a particular new product is feasible and limits 
the range of (constant unit) production costs to an interval [£,�] .  
Any o f  a number of potential producers may produce the new product at 
a cost of o per unit. However, by expending resources on development 
activity, a firm may be able to reduce production costs below o, The 
production cost parameter, o, which results from a development trial, 
is assumed to be a random variable representable as a draw from a pro-
bability distribution defined over [£,c] ,  Development coats (per tri-
al) are assumed fixed, Sampling is assumed to be essentially instan-
taneoua, occurring before the market off ioially opens, Demand for the 
product is assumed stationary, Therefore, maxmized prof its are 
representable in present value terms, dependent only on production ' 
costs, 
Consider the single-firm problem, If the firm produces at 
cost level o, it receives the corresponding level of monopoly profit, 
denoted by n (o), Given the assumptions made so far, 
n (c) 1 - max; (p (q) q  - oq},
q 
Profits are assumed to obey the following restrictions, 
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M. n(c) is non-negative, bounded and continuously differentiable 
with n'(c) < 0 on l.!l..�] .  
Development activity is assumed to consist of drawing a 
production cost level from [.!l.,c] according to the continuously 
differentiable distribution function F (c) . Let x1,x2, • • •  ,Xn represent
a sequence of such independent draws (development trials), and let k 
represent the fixed level of development costs per trial. Define 
Definition 1. A nonnegative integer-valued random variable N is said 
to be a stopping rule for tho sequence x1, •. . ,Xn if the occurrence or
nonoccurrenco of tho event {N = n) can be determined by looking at the 
values of x1, • • •  ,Xn (Cinlar, 1975),
The firm wants to choose a stopping rule so as to maximize its 
expected gain E[YN],  where N is the (random) stopping time.
An argument duo to Robbins [1970] guarantees the existence of an 
optimal stopping rule which is myopic so long as the random variables 
n(X1),n(X2),  ••• , are independent and identically distributed (i, i,d.) 
with finite mean. Since x1,Xi•••• are i. i.d and n(c) is bounded, both
requirements are met, Thus the optimal stopping rule is of the form 
stop whenever E[Yn+l I x1, • • •  ,xnl i yn;
otherwise continue, 
But 
Yn + Jm[n(c) - n (m)]dF(c) - k£ 
where m = min{x1, ••• ,xn). Thus the condition for stopping is: stop
if and only if 
V(m) = jcn (c) - n (m)]dF(c) - k i O.
£ 
V(m) represents the value of one additional draw when the best 
draw to date is m. The rule is to stop whenever an additional draw 
has non-positive value, Since tho firm can elect to forego 
development and produce at �. the sign of V(;) is important. 
�. (a) V(c) > 0, 
(b) V(c) i 0, 
If �(a) holds, then V(�) > 0, V(£) < 0 and because V(m) is 
continuously differentiable with 
V'(m) = J - n'(m)dF (c) = -n'(m)F (m) > 0, 
.!l. 
there exists a unique � s (£,�) such that V(m) 7 0 as m7 �. If �(b)
holds, then no development is optimal; � = ; , 
Thus for the model of Section II, the optimal stopping rule can 
s 
(1) 
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be characterized in terms of the reservation cost level e: 
stop whenever m i e; 
otherwise continue development. 
It is easy to show that (when A2 (a) holds) e increases with
development costs k; that is, as development costs increase, so does 
the threshold level below which development ceases. Furthermore, a 
mean profit-preserving spread in the distribution F (c) [Diamond and 
Stiglitz, 19741 results in a lower reservation cost level [see, e.g., 
Kohn and Shavell, 1974] . 
III. STRATEGIC SEARCH F.QUILIBRIUM
If a n11111ber of firms are undertaking development, then the value 
(to any one firm) of developing the product depends not only on its 
own production costs but alao on the production costs of its rivals. 
This ii bec·ause ultimately the firms will supply the new product 
oligopolistically and therefore price and market shares will depend 
upon the production coats of all firms. Thus a generalization of the 
search model which allows game-playing rivals is required. 
This paper focuses on the two-person case so as to highlight the 
conceptual differences between the game model and that of Section II  
without the technical complexity of the n-person case. 
Suppose that there are two potential suppliers of the new good, 
named 1 and 2. Let ci represent firm i's constant marginal production
cost. Then ni(c1,c2) denotes the present value of i's profits,
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generated in a game of duopoly in the new product market. 
A3. ni(c1,c2) is assumed to be bounded, non-negative and twice
an. an. 
differentiable with �(c1,c2) < 0, �(c1,c2) > 0, and
2 
�
aciacj 
(cl,c2) 
- 2 < O for all (c1,c2) a [£,c] • 
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That is, as the rival's cost parameter increases, i's profits 
increase, but less so as i's own production cost parameter increases.3
In this section the problem will be formulated in a standard same 
theoretic framework. Accordingly, each firm will possess full 
information regarding the opponent's strategy space and payoff but 
will not be able to observe the outcomes of its rival's development 
trials. 
One needs to define random variables analogous to those of 
Section II. i i i Let x1,x2, • • •  ,Xni 
represent a sequence of independent
random variables (or development trials) for firm i. Each is drawn 
from [£,c] according to the continuously differentiable distribution 
function Fi(ci).
per trial and mi 
Let ki be firm i's fixed level of development coats
i i min{x1, • • •  ,xn }. Firm i is assumed to know the
i 
results of its own development trials, but is .l!!!A1!1.o. to observe the 
results of its rival's trials. 
Definition 2. A strategy for i is a stopping rule for the sequence 
i i i x1,x2, • • •  ,Xni
' and will be denoted Ni.
the space of all such stopping rules. 
The strategy space for i is 
Since firm i does not know the outcomes of its rival's 
Nj j j development trials, the actual stopping cost mj = min{x1, • • •  ,XN} is j 
a random variable to i, However, given any stopping rule Nj' i can
N
compute Pr{mj
j i c},
Define 
i1' (N1) ia similarly defined,n2 
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Tho objective of firm i is to choose a stopping rule Ni so as to
maximize its expected gain, taking i's strategy Nj as giyen. That is,
i wants to choose Ni 10 as to maximize
Definition 3.  A strategy Ni is a best response for i to Nj if Ni
maximizes E [Y� (Nj) ] ,i 
Proposition 1. A best response for i to Nj exists and is myopic.
That is, the best response is of the form 
i i i i stop whenever E [Y 
+l
(N.)lx1, • • •  ,x ] i y (N.) ; ni J ni ni J 
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otherwise continue. 
Proof: For i = 1. The proof for i = 2 is analogous, For any N2, this
problem is isomorphic to that of Section II, where it is now required 
1 N2 1 N2 
that E Cn1<x1,m2 ) ] ,  • • •  ,E [n1(xn1,m2 ) ]  are i.i.d. with finite mean.
1 1 
Since x1, • • •  ,X are i,i.d. and n1<c1,c2) is bounded, bothnl 
requirements are met. Therefore, for any Nj' Robbins' [
1970) result
again guarantees existence of an optimal stopping rule which is 
myopic. 
Q,E.D, 
Proposition 1 states that a myopic stopping rule (sequential 
search behavior) is a best response to .!!!Y rival stopping rule�even 
one involving nonsequential search. Thus, if a Nash equilibrium 
exists, it will involve sequential search behavior, The best response 
is further characterized below, 
For given N2, 
where v1 <m1,m;> = �l Cn1(c1,m;> - n1(�,m;)]dF1(c1) - k1 is the value
.£ 
to 1 of an additional draw when m1 is player l's best draw to date and
N2 2 stops with cost parameter m2 • Thus the condition for stopping (for
1) is: stop whenever
10 
Proposition 2. The best response for 1 to N2 can be characterized by
a reservation cost level 61CN2) s [£,�] .  That is, the best response
is to 
otherwise continue, 
Proof: Recall that N2 is independent of mi since m1 is unobservable to
2. Then u
1
(�,N2) is differentiable in m1 with au
1
/am1
N2 
= E [-(an1<mi•mz ) /ac1)F1<mi> l > O since an1/ac1 < o for all Cc1,c2) .
1 1 -Note that U (£,N2) = -k1 < 0 for all N2• If U (c,N2) > O, then by the
1 
continuity and monotonicity of U in m1, there exists a unique number
- __ 1 l. l. 61CN2) a (£,c) such that IJ(�,N2) < 0 as m1< 61(�). If
1 - - -U (c,N2) i 0, then define 61(�) = c. In either case, if it is
optimal to stop at m1 = 61CN2), then it is optimal to stop for all 
� < 61CN2) as well, Therefore the best response can be characterized 
as 
otherwise continue. 
Q. E.D 
Thus the stopping set for 1 is a connected set [£,61CN2)]  for any
N2• Hence if a Nash equilibrium exists, it is in strategies with the 
reservation property. Propositions 1 and 2 imply that one may eschew 
the space of arbitrary stopping rules and, without loss of generality, 
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restrict consideration to myopic stopping rules with the reservation 
property. Thus one can redefine the notions of strategy, payoff and 
best response in terms of this restricted space of stopping rules. 
This is done in the remainder of the paper. The same notation will be 
used, with the understanding that ej will be substituted for Nj.
Definition 2', A strategy for i is a stopping rule of the form 
stop whenever mi i ei;
otherwise continue, 
The strategy space for i is the space of all such stopping rules, 
Since these rules can be indexed by ca [£,C] , one could equivalently 
define the strategy space for i to be Ci = [£,c] , i = 
1,2.
Since firm i does not know the outcomes of its rival's 
N
development trials, the actual stopping cost m.J is a random variable 
J 
N
to i. However, given any strategy ej a CJ
'· i knows that m/ s [£,ejl .
N 
Furthermore, Pr{mj
j i cj) = Fj (cj)/Fj <ej> for all cj a [£,ejl . To see
this, simply note that j stops the first time mj enters 
[£,ejl '
distribution of the ''failures '' xj > � is irrelevant, The• n "J' j 
The 
distribution of the successful one, given that it is successful, is 
If �j = c, then j undertakes no search.
probability one. Firm j simply exercises its option to produce at the 
highest known feasible cost c, 
Define 
ff:2 nl (n;_,c2)dF2(c2)/F2Ce2> - nlkl
= 
}
1 <a;_,-;;) - nl kl
Y! <e1> is similarly defined.2 
�2 < c 
Then the objective of firm i is to choose a stopping rule so as 
to maximize its expected gain, taking l'A strategy (with reservation 
That ia, i wants to maximize 
where Ni is i's (random) stopping time,
Proposition 1 states that optimal behavior for firm i requires 
the use of a myopic stopping rule. 
1 1 1 
E [Y 1<�2) lx1, .  .. , xn 1 nl+ 1 
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where v
1
Cm1,c2) = .(11 Cn1Cc1,c2) - n1Cn;_,c2)JdF1Cc1) - k1 is the value
.!!. 
to 1 of an additional draw when m1 is player l's best draw to date and
2 stops with cost parameter c2•
Thus the condition for stopping (for 1) is 
(2) 
Notice that now firm 1 decides to stop (or continue) based on the 
expected value of an additional draw when l's best draw to date is m1, 
and given that 2 plays the strategy e2 8 [.Q.,-;;) ,
If player 2 plays e2 = -;;, since this implies no search by 2,
1 - 1 1 E [Y 1Cc)lx1, .. . , x  1 nl+ nl 
Therefore u
1
cm1,e2> is discontinuous at e2 = c, and at this 
point, firm 1 should stop whenever 
Similarly, for firm 2, the optimal rule is to stop whenever 
( 3) 
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(4) 
for �l e [£,c) , and whenever
(5) 
It is clear that the expressions v1 <�,c2) and v2 cc1,mz> will be
important in what follows. 
Pr�podtion 3.  i i av /ami)O and av /acj)O for all mi e [£,C] and for all
cj s [.11.,c],
Proof. For i = 1, j = 2, 
and 
- 2 for all (�,c2) e[.11.,c] by A3.
As i's own best draw declines, the likelihood of getting 
Q. E. D. 
increasingly better draws declines while the sampling cost is fixed. 
As the opponent's cost declines, the marginal value of a lower 
2 
a "i production cost parameter for i declines since -a��  < 0, C iuc j 
15 
So in
either case the marginal value (to i) of another trial declines. The 
sign of V
1
(�1£) is also of interest,
A4. (a) v
1
c�,c) > o.
Cb> v
1
c�.£> i o.
If A4(a) holds, then since av1/ac2 > O, v1 c�,c2) > 0 for all
1 -If A4(b) holds, then V (c,c2) i 0 for an interval 
[£,C') 5_ [£,C ) ,
Which of these properties are passed through to U
1
Cm1,�2)? From 
expression (2),  it is clear that for (�,�2) s (.11.,c] x [£,�) ,
u1 cm1,�2) is continuously differentiable with
(6) 
Furthermore, using Leibniz' rule and collecting terms, 
where the inequality follows from the fact that v
1 
is increasing in 
its second argument. 
1 - -If A4(a) holds, then U (c,t2) > O for all t2 e [£,c]. If A4(b) 
1 -holds, then U (c,t2) i 0 for an interval [£,c''] 5. [£,c]. 
Definition 3'. A best response function for 1 is a function 
[£,C] such that 
A boat response function for 2 is def inod in the obvious way. The 
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noxt step is to demonstrate the existence of and to describe the best 
response functions. 
Proposition 4. There exists· a nonincreasing best response function 
for i which may be discontinuous only at ej : c.
Proof: See the Appendix. 
Proposition 4 implies that one can characterize the optimal 
contingent stopping rule for i as follows: 
given that j will stop whenever mj i ej and continue otherwise,
i's best response is to stop whenever mi i 6i(�j) ;  otherwise
continue. 
A best response function is illustrated in Figure 1, The fact 
that 6i<ej> is downward sloping implies that the more aggressive the
the development strategy the rival j undertakes (the lower is �j),  the
less aggressive is the optimal development strategy for i (the higher 
17 
0 c 
FIGURE 1 
• • 
Definition 4. A strategy pair <e1.e2> is a Nash equilibrium if 
• • • • el = 61 <e2> and e2 = 62<e1> ·
Proposition S. 
• • 
There exist• a Nash equilibrium <e1,e2> in c1 x c2• 
18 
nondecreasing and is therefore upper semicontinuous from the left and 
lower semicontinuous from the right. Application of Roberts' and 
Sonnensohein'a (1976] lem11a implies that the function W <e1> has a
• • • 
fixed point e1• Thon e2 • o2<e1> completes the Nash equilibrium pair 
• • 
<e1.e2>·
IV. COMPARATIVE STATICS
Q.E.D. 
The usual comparative statics results can be demonstrated to
apply to the best response functions. 
(a) 
and 
(b) a mean profit-preserving spread of Fi (in the sense of Diamond
and Stiglitz (1974]) decreases oi(ej> '
Proof: See the Appendix. 
Thus for any fixed ej' an increase in i's own development costs
results in less development, while a mean profit-preserving spread 
results in increased development activity. 
However, these intuitive results need not extend to the 
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• • equilibrium reservation cost levels <e1,e2> . To see this consider the 
example in Figure 2, in which there are three equilibria: A, B, and C,
One would • • intuitively expect that ae1/8k1 > 0, ae1/8k2 < o, 
• O, and ae2/ak2 > O. While this is true at A and C, the 
signs are completely reversed at B. To see this, recall that 
ao1<e2>/ak1 > O whenever o1 <e2> s (£,c) . This means that at Nash
• • 
equilibrium B, ae1/ak1 ( 0 and ae2/ak1 > 0, That is, an increase in 
firm l's development cost induces 1 to undertake .!!!!2!'.Jt development 
activity, while its rival reduces its development activity (see Figure 
3), Similarly, since a mean profit-preserving spread in F1 lowers the 
• • 
function 61 <e2>· this spread actually increases el (and decreases e2>
at B (see Figure 4) . 
A related question is that of the effect of asymmetry, The 
possibility of multiple equilibria makes it clear that the firm with 
higher development costs need not have a higher equilibrium 
reservation cost than its lower-development cost rival. Similarly, 
firms with identical development costs need not end up at a symmetric 
Nash equilibrium in reservation costs, 
20 21 
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FIGURE 2 
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FIGURE 3 
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FIGURE 4 
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v. EFFECTS OF RIVALRY
An interesting question is whether a particular finn will engage 
in more development activity when faced by a rival or when that firm 
sis a monopolist. 
Let us designate firm 1 as our particular firm. Thon n (c1)
denotes monopoly profit when marginal production cost is c1 s [£,c], 
while n1Cc1,c2) denotes firm 111 profits when faced by a rival with
marginal production cost of c2• It is quite reasonable to claim that 
- 2 n (c1) L n1Cc1,c2) for all (c1,c2) a [£,c] • Unfortunately, tho 
critical expression is not tho � of profits, but tho increment to 
profits generated by an additional development trial. Again, lot m1 
A 
denote l's lowest cost to date and lot el represent firm 
111
(monopolistic) reservation cost level. 
Proposition 7. If n (c1) - n (�) L n1Cc1,�> - n1 (�,c) for all
-- 2 (�,c1) a [c,c] with � L c1, 
equilibrium pair. 
A • • • 
then e1 i e1, where <e1.�2) is any Nash
That is, if the increment to firm l's monopoly profits (due to a 
cost decrease from m1 to c1) exceeds tho increment to firm l's profits 
when faced with a rival having a production cost c, then firm 1 will 
choose a lower reservation cost level as a monopolist than as a 
duopolist. Intuitively, this is because a monopolist, having a 
greater volume of sales than a duopolist, benefits more from a given 
cost reduction than does a duopolist (under the hypothesis of the 
24 
proposition) ,  Hence a monopolist may find continued development 
profitable where a duopolist will have ceased. 
�Since 61 <�2) is nonincreasing one need only show that 
A • 
Nash equilibrium, �l i �1• Inequality (1) implies that
where the second inequality follows from the hypothesis of the 
propoai ti on, 
Now 61(;) i1 either c or is uniquely defined by u1 c61(;),;) = o. 
Since u
1 
i1 increasing in its first argument, in either case we have 
A 
�l i 61 (c) .  The proposition follows. Of course, an analogous
proposition holds for firm 2. 
Q,E.D. 
It would be nice to know all the circumstances under which the 
hypothesis of Proposition 7 holds. While it is impossible to tell in 
general, for the case of the linear demand curve P = a - bQ, a 
sufficient condition is6 a - � L 8(; - �). Since the hypothesis also
represents a sufficient, but not necessary condition, the results of 
Proposition 7 hold somewhat more generally. 
For any choice of reservation cost level �. the number of 
development trials required is a geometrically-distributed random 
variable with mean l/F1(�). Thus firm l's expected costs as a 
A 
2s 
monopolist are k1/F1C�1) ,  while firm l's expected costs as a duopolist 
" . 
Since �l i �l' firm 
1 spends more as a monopolist than
as a duopolist, However, total duopoly costs are 
• • 
Ck1/F1C�1> + k2/F2C�2)J, Thus one cannot say with any confidence 
whether monopoly development costs exceed or fall short of total 
duopoly costs. 
An alternative interpretation of nonrivalrou1 behavior is that of 
a cartel, rather than a monopoly. That is, suppose firms 1 and 2 
enter into an agreement to coordinate their development strategies 10 
as to maximize joint profits. What is an optimal develoP111ent strategy 
in this case? Since marginal costs have been assumed constant, only 
the minimum cost firm will produce output in the new market. Thus the 
joint payoff will be � n(c1) or n(c2) where n(ci) represents
monopoly profits when firm i supplies the good at cost c1,
Suppose that at each stage the cartel may elect to conduct a 
development trial for firm 1 or for firm 2, but not for both 
simultaneously, Because there is essentially instantaneous sampling, 
this is without loss of generality, Then application7 of Pandora's
Rule (Weitzman, 1979) yields the following optimal strategy, 
A 
First compute �j
reservation cost level for firm i if i were a monopolist. Then firm j 
26 
A 
should conduct development trials until a production cost of cj � ej
is drawn; then stop, No development trials should be undertaken by 
firm i # j. 
Thus the cartel will engage in more development activity than the 
noncooperative firms if the hypothesis of Proposition 7 holds for 
either firm 1 or firm 2. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has shown that traditional search theory can be
extended in a natural way to include game-playing agents, The 
existence of Nash equilibria in stopping rules is demonstrated, 
Furthermore, the equilibrium strategies are shown to be myopic and 
po11es1 the reservation property, However, the existence of multiple 
equilibria can provide some counterintuitive results regarding the 
effects of increases in development costs on the equilibrium 
reservation production cost levels. For example, an increase in firm 
i's development costs can cause firm i to undertake more development, 
It seems clear that this analysis could be extended to the case 
of n firms. 1 However, since the expressions like U (m1,e2.e3, • • •  ,en>
will now have a jump whenever ej = c (j � 1), there will be (n - 1)1
such discontinuities for each player (and the analyst!) to contend 
with. Several other directions for generalization are obvious. 
Discounting, allowing simultaneous production and development, and 
allowing rivals to observe the results of development trials are but a 
27 
few, One would suspect that the results of this paper on the 
optimality of myopic stopping rules would be particularly sensitive to 
changes in the assumptions regarding the observability of the rival's 
development progress. 
28
APPENDIX 
Proof of Proposition 4. For i = 1. The proof for i = 2 is analogous,
Consider e2 B [,£,c) , 1 -If A4(a) holds, then U (c,e2> > 0 for all
1 e2 8 [,£,c), Since u (.£,e2> = -kl < 0 for all e2 B [,£,c) and since
1 U (�,e2> is continuously differentiable in m1 for each fixed t2 with
au1ta� > O, the intermediate value theorem and monotonicity guarantee
- 1 tho existence of a unique value el B [,£,C) such that u <e1·C2> = o.
For e2 a [.£,;) , u1 is continuously differentiable in (�,e2> with
au1ta� > O, 10 there exists an implicit function 61Cc2> such that
u1<01<C2>.e2> = 0 for all C2 s [,£,;) . Furthermore, 61<C2> is
continuously differentiable with 
au1co1<c2>.c2>1ac2 
a - au1co1<c2>.c2>/a�·
By inequalities (6) and (7), 6iCC2) < 0 for all C2 s [,£,;) 
whenever A4(a) holds, If A4(b) holds, then there exists an interval 
- 1-(possibly [,£,c)) whore U (c,C2) i 0, For all C2 in this interval,
61(C2) Co
Tho continuity of u1(�,c2> on [.£,;] x [.£,�) ensures the
continuity of 61cc2> on [.£,o) .
However, 61CC2) may take a downward jump at c2 = c. To see this,
recall that u1Cm1,;) = v
1cm1,;), If v
1c;,�) i O, then 61(c) = �. But
_1 - - 1 - 2 V-(c,c) i O implies that U (�,e2> i 0 for all (�,c2> B [,£,c] • 
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So 
61ce2> 3 c in this case. If v1c;,;) > O, then since v1C.£,;) < 0 and
v1 is increasing in its first argument, 61(;) lies strictly between .£
and ; and is uniquely defined by v1c�,;) = 0, while
61c;> = lim 61<e2> is defined by
A -
ez+o-
61c;> = c if li� u1c;.c2> i o
c2+c_ 
and ol(c) is implicitly defined by
-
Since c > o1(c) s (.£,c) , case (8) is done.
(8) 
( 9) 
Consider case (9) . Because v1<�,;) > v1c�,c2) for all c2 < o,
Since these inequalities hold for all � B [,£,;], 
u1c61 c;> .�> = v
1c61 c;> .�> > H� u1c61 c;> .c2> = o
c2+c_ 
" -
implying that o1(c) > o1(c) .
Proof of Proposition 6. 
(a) 
in view of (6) , 
-au1<o1<e2>.e2>tak1 
au1<o1<e2>.e2>tan;_
Similarly for i = z. 
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(Q, E.D.) 
> 0 
(b) Following Kohn and Shavell, let z be a parameter of F1, 
whose increase represents an increase in riskiness, However, F1Cc1;z) 
is required to satisfy the analogs of tho Diamond-Stiglitz conditions 
(12) and (13) for a mean utility-preserving spread, For fixed e2,
mi �z � J.2. J.2. acl <c1,c2) [dF2<cz)IF2<e2>1
-a for all n;_. with equality when m1 = c. 
The expected benefits of sampling become 
ao1<e2> -au1<o1<e2>.e2;zl/az 
az = au1<o1<e2>,e2;zl/am
' Since in view of (6) we are interested 
in sgn au1/az.
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Integration by parts with respect to c1 yields 
- r1 .2. 
The first expression is zero since aF1(,2.; z)/az c 0 (i.e., 
F1(,2.;z) = 0 for all z), The second expression is nonnegative by (10) ,
Therefore ao1<e2> /az i o. Tho proof for i = z is analogous,
(Q. E,D.) 
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FOOTNOTES 
1, Jensen [1980] is in the process of generalizing his earlier work 
[1979] to the duopolistic case, His work differs analytically 
from this paper, but the two are in the same spirit. 
2. The payoffs n1(c1,c2),  n2(c1,c2) are envisioned as the allocations
e e generated by Nash equilibrium output levels (q1,11z> in the duopoly
game with payoffs
3, These aasmptions are easily shown to be valid for a number of 
simple demand functions, Examples include P = a - blnQ, 
p = a - bQ, p • a + b/Q, 
4. Sufficient conditions for the equilibrium to bo unique are A4(a),
an analogous condition on v2<£,�), and
and 
33 
In this case, 6i<ej> s (£,;) and -
1 < 6i<ej> < O, so that a unique
equilibrium exists. 
S. I am indebted to John Roberts for suggesting this section, 
6, For P = a - bQ, n(c1) - n(lll;J.) L n1(c1,;) - n1(111;J.,c) for all.,_ and 
c1 with m1 L c1 if and only if 2a - 16c + 1lll;J. + 7c1 L 0 for all Mi
and c1 with m1 L c1, A sufficient condition for this to be true 
is a - £ L 8(c - £) , Note that this is independent of the slope 
coefficient b, 
7. I am indebted to Carl J, Lydick for pointing out the applicability
of Pandora's Rule to this case.
8, Tho sign reversal is due to the fact that DiS11ond and Stiglitz use 
utility, which is increasing in its argument, while i's profit 
decreases in ci'
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